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I. Preliminary Remarks
The problem of the interpretation of norms is common to the
legal practice of all states. Nevertheless, methodological approaches
differ according to the legal system, the skill of the local lawyers and
scholars, and the exigencies of legal life. The most obvious differences
probably exist between the civil law and common law systems, but
many states cannot even be classified under these two mainstreams because their legal systems are governed by the specific features and rules
of their main religion.
Against this background, Turkey has to be classified as a country
which belongs to the world of civil law. Its constitutional system-at
least as laid down in the present constitution-follows the principles of
secularism and the rule of law through a strict hierarchical system of
norms and through the protection of the fundamental rights.' The
superiority of the constitution is followed by the priority given statutory
law, the latter principle arising from the sovereignty of the Nation, as
represented by the Great National Assembly of Turkey.
The question of interpretation of a Turkish statute does not only
arise in Turkish courts. According to the principles of private international law, a foreign court may also be obliged to answer a preliminary
question according to Turkish law or to apply Turkish law to all legal
aspects of the case. 2 Consequently, a court may have to interpret a
norm in conformity with the methodological approaches practiced in
Turkey. Consideration of the importance of legislative history materials is only one issue of the problem of interpretation, yet it is dogmatically one of the most important aspects.
I The Turkish Constitutional Court has emphasized that the system of the protection
of fundamental rights under the Turkish Constitution should be compared with the system
of the European Convention on Human Rights; thus, the Court concludes, the interpretation of Turkish fundamental rights must, to a certain extent, follow the theory and practice
under the Convention. See, e.g., Judgment of Jan. 10, 1991, Constitutional Court, Resmi
Gazete [R.G.] No. 21162 (Turk.).
2 This is especially true for family law, but also for many cases of contract law and
commercial litigation. In addition, in the United States, Turkish law is partly applicable in
cultural property cases. See, e.g., Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 762 F.
Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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II. The Turkish Legal System
In order to consider the importance of legislative history materials
in the course of the interpretation of statutes in Turkish theory and
practice, it is useful to give a brief account of the history and structure
of the Turkish legal system, the role of the Parliament, the function of
statutory laws, and the methodological approaches in Turkey.
A.

Codification Under the Influence of ContinentalEurope

Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, the legal system of
the Ottoman Empire had been founded solidly on the principles of
Islamic law, with absolute power belonging to the Padishah. During
the nineteenth century, however, the Ottoman Empire faced an era of
drastic change in every respect, but primarily in the political and legal
sectors. The decline of the military strength of the Empire and its economic weakness provoked the need for fundamental reforms. The
Gfilhane Decree of 1839, in which Ottoman citizens were granted
some fundamental freedoms and rights, is considered to be the starting point of these reforms, which developed during the Tanzimat period. 3 Furthermore, the cultural influence of the states of continental
Europe, especially France, showed itself in a broad movement towards
codification. Principles of commercial, penal, and public or administrative law were taken from France. Later, Italy became another source
of reception of foreign law.
The first Ottoman Constitution of 1876, 4 which introduced a democratically legitimated parliament, seems to have been modeled on the
Belgian Constitution of 1831 and the Prussian Constitution of 1851. 5
The Constitution of 1876 provided for a modern procedure of legislation-with the Padishah having the last word-and the protection of
liberties and fundamental rights. After a period of suspension under
the rule of the Padishah Abdfilhamit II, the Constitution was restored
by the Young Turks in 1909, and the government was turned into a
parliamentary monarchy. 6 To the benefit of a government responsible
to the parliament, the powers of the Padishah were restricted. At this
point, it is hard to deny that the Turkish Constitution had a certain
resemblance to the French Constitution of 1875.
Despite the obvious reception of the ideas of European law, until
3 See 2 STANFORD J. SAmW & EZEL K. SHAw,HISTORY OF THE OrrOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TuRKEY 58 (1977); BERNARD LEWIS, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN TuRKEY 104 (1961).
4 See 2 SHAw & SHAw, supra note 3, at 174; LEwIs supra note 3, at 156. See also ROBERT

(1963).
5 See Colkun Ook, 1876 Anayasasinin Kaynaklari [The Foundations of the 1876 Constitution], in 1 TORE PARLAMIENTOCULUiLUN ILK YOZVILI (Siyasi Ilimler Tfrk Dernegi ed., 1977).

DEVEREUX, THE FiRST OTrrOIAN CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD

6 2 SHAw & SHAw, supra note 3, at 273; LEWIS, supra note 3, at 190. See, e.g., DAVID
KUSHNER, THE RISE OF TURKISH NATIONALISM 1876-1908 (1977); ZIYA GKAL', THE PRINCIPLES
OF TuRKism (Robert Devereux ed., 1968); ZAREVAND, UNITED AND INDEPENDENT TuRANIA
(V.N. Dadrian trans., 1926) (1971).
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the end of the Ottoman Empire, the Sharia (Islamic law)-more comparable to a common law system than to a civil law system-remained
largely in force. The consequence during this period was an unfortunate legal and jurisdictional dualism that caused uncertainty in both
theory and practice. Nevertheless, the reception of law from the continental European legal systems continued, especially from France.
Common law principles had no opportunity to take root.
B. Modernization Under the Republic
After the defeat in World War I, the end of the sultanate and the
caliphate, which had been unified in the person of the Padishah, approached. The war of independence under the leadership of the general Mustafa Kemal Pasha-later Atatfirk-was accompanied by the
establishment of an independent political power in Anatolia. In 1920,
the Great National Assembly was founded. 7 It followed the principle
of the unification of powers in order to establish and represent the
sovereignty of the Turkish Nation. This Assembly was the one organ of
the emerging Republic that concentrated all political power in itself.
In 1922, the sultanate was abolished and the Padishah expelled, and
the Republic was officially proclaimed in October 1923. By 1924, the
first republican constitution went into force, and in the same year, the
caliphate ended.
The emergence of the Republic marked a new period of modernization for the legal system. The Islamic law was derogated as a whole
and the step toward the adoption of the principles of a continental
European legal system was taken. In 1926, the French version of the
Swiss Civil Code was translated into Turkish and adopted, with few
changes, as the Turkish Civil Code. The Code is still the foundation of
Turkish civil law and is considered to be the "keystone of the philosophy of life of the Turkish society." 8 The Republic went on to adopt the
Swiss Code of Obligations and the Italian Penal Code of 1889. In 1927,
the Civil Procedure Code of the Swiss canton Neuenburg became the
Turkish Civil Procedure Code. Two years later, the German Criminal
Procedure Code, then in its newest version, was also translated and
integrated into Turkish legislation. The failed adaptation of the
French influenced Commercial Code and the Swiss civil law led, in
1956, to a totally new codification of the Turkish Code of Commerce.
This again demonstrates a balanced combination of the different continental European legal systems in the commercial field, harmonized
primarily with its Swiss origins.
7 2 SHAW &

SHAW,

8 SELAHATTIN

S.

supra note 3, at 340; LEwIs, supra note 3, at 360.
Grisi DERSLERI [LESSONS IN

TEKINAY, MEDEN! HUKUKA

To TURISH CIIL LAw] 37 (4th ed., 1984) (quotation translated by author).

INTRODUCTION
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M. The Development of Continental European Legal Thinking in
Turkey

In the years after the proclamation of the Republic, and in the
course of the great secular reforms of the legal system in the spirit of
European models, both doctrine and courts in Turkey have been
adapted to the norms of European legal thinking.
In the last century of the Ottoman Empire, cultural education was
shaped by the attendance of Turkish students and scholars at the European universities and academies. Lessons at the first Turkish colleges
of medicine, music, and fine arts were given in French, and military
education was given by German officers. Later, this shaping process
also affected legal education. The first faculty of law was founded in
1900 at the Darfilfnnun (Istanbul University). European professors,
especially from France, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, helped the
young Turkish lawyers acquaint themselves with the legal thinking behind the positive law as received from continental Europe. This educational process was even accelerated during the Thirties when a number
of German professors escaped the Nazi regime, settled in Turkey, and
were welcomed as competent teachers. Meanwhile, a system of legal
education that followed the French licence system had taken root.
Turkish lawyers now undergo a four-year program of legal studies
at the university, and admission to the bar requires a year of practical
studies at the office of an attorney-at-law. Similarly, judicial candidates
must practice a year at court before becoming judges, while the doctoral candidate must successfully complete a postgraduate program.
Many Turkish scholars, and most of the judges in the higher courts,
have spent at least some time at continental European universities.
Many of them gained their doctorates there, civil lawyers preferring
Switzerland and Germany, criminal lawyers going to Italy, France, or
Germany, and public lawyers spending some years in France or Germany. It is quite natural that the "product" of such a system and tradition-the young lawyer or judge-will think in terms of continental
European law (i.e., positive law). As a matter of fact, Turkish legal
literature and case law demonstrate this conclusion; and likewise the
treatment of law by Turkish judges-especially of statutory law-has to
be seen in the light of this phenomenom.
IV. The Role of Parliament
The role of Parliament in the constitutional history of Turkey is
shaped by a specific national identification. Turkish nationalism had
close relations to the nationalist movement of the nineteenth century
in Europe. The failure of an "Ottoman" nationalism helped the Young
Turks movement to impose itself between 1909 and the end of World
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War 19 and prepared the soil for a Turkish nationalism, which, as
Kemalist nationalism, was finally incorporated in the constitution in
1937.10
The establishment of the Great National Assembly, on the basis of
rudimentary constitutional legislation in 1920, was the first result of
the movement toward independence initiated in 1919 by Mustafa
Kemal Pasha, or Atatfirk. 11 This Assembly was considered to be the
embodiment of the spirit of liberty and independence as well as the
unity of the Turkish Nation. The principle of the unity of powers,
rather than their separation, was the essence of the functions of the
Great National Assembly. The development of a legal order in the
spirit of continental European legal positivism (Rechtspositivismus),
which at the time was identical with statutory positivism (Gesetzespositivismus), together with the consciousness of the force of the Nation, led
the Parliament to an eminent role in Turkish constitutional life. The
refusal to recognize a constitutional jurisprudence-other states such
as Czechoslovakia and Austria had introduced constitutional courts at
that time-was consequently interpreted as indicative of the sovereignty of Parliament in its role as the sole constructor of the new legal
order. According to this principle, Article 26 of the 1924 Constitution
provided that the Great National Assembly could bind the courts by
"interpretative decisions" on the meaning of its own statutes. This
clearly shows the superiority of the legislative will in constitutional life
under that constitution.
However, with the establishment of a Constitutional Court under
the 1961 Constitution and the express enforcement of the rule of law
(literally: state of law; German: Rechtsstaat, Turkish: hukuk devlet), the
legislative will of the Parliament became secondary to the superiority
of the Constitution;12 the democratic principle was framed by the superiority of the law, and the Parliament had to renounce the power to
interpret its own legislation. Parliament retained its legislative functions, however, as the Great National Assembly remained the primary
institution to form and develop the Turkish legal order.1 3 A short description of the role of the statutory law (German: Gesetz; Turkish:
kanun or yasa) will explicate this point.
V.

The Function of Statutory Law in the Turkish Legal System
A.

Notions: Law and Statutory Law

As to the notions of "law" (German: Recht; French: droit, Turkish:
hukuk) and "statutory law" (German: Gesetz; French: loi; Turkish:
9 See 2 SHAW & SHAW, supra note 3, at 340; LEWIS, supra note 3, at 360.

10 SyMposiuM, TOiRKnE is BANKAS! INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON ATATORK (1984).

11 2 SHAw & SHAw, supra note 3, at 341-42.
12 Itt at 418. See also TURK,.CONST. OF 1961, arts. 145-47.
13 2 SHAW & SHAW, supra note 3, at 417.
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kanun or yasa), the Turkish legal system follows the continental European legal culture. In the colloquial speech, Gesetz, loi, and kanun also
may be used as synonyms for Recht, droit, and hukuk, but the professional legal language is quite clear on this point: a statutory law (kanun
or yasa) is a regulation adopted in a formal legislatory process in Parliament; "law" (hukuk) in its proper sense is the abstract notion of the
whole of legal and enforceable norms that regulate the relationship
between the subject and the state, whatever their source may be. This
distinction does not exclude customary law, however, which is always
subsidiary to statutory laws. Turkish doctrine fully accepts the existence of a hierarchy of norms. The highest position within this hierarchy is taken by the Constitution, including-according to the
Constitutional Court-the general principles of law. 14 The next position is held by statutory law (including a special form of legislation
called kanun hikmiinde kararname, meaning "order with the force of a
statute"), followed by tiiziik (ordinance), y'netmelik (decree), and
others. In this hierarchy, every norm must conform with the one in
the higher position and is subject in this respect to judicial review.
B.

The Constitution and Statutory Law

The position of the constitution and statutory law within the norm
hierarchy is not only a result of a raisonnement itatique, but is positively
stipulated in the Constitution itself. Article 11, Section 2 of the Constitution of 1982 provides that "statutory laws must be in conformity with
the Constitution."' 5 The significance of statutory law, however, is established by several sections of the Constitution which allow limitations
on fundamental rights, but only to the extent that the limitations are
effected by statute.1 6 This significance is also indicated by an emphasis
on formal legislative procedure and by regulations limiting those orders that can have the force of a statute. According to Article 91 of the
Constitution, an order with the force of a statute can be promulgated
on short notice by the Government where there is a statute which has
previously defined the subject of this abbreviated form of legislation,
and where the order will be submitted to the Parliament for legislative
review after it takes effect. Fundamental liberties and political rights,
however, may not be limited by such an order with the force of a statute. This again shows the specific importance of a formally adopted
statute. The same importance is also demonstrated by the fact that it is
a statute by which, according to a special procedure under Article
175,17 constitutional amendments are to be effected.
The preeminent role of the statute in the Turkish legal system is
14 Id. at 418. See also TuRx. CONST. OF 1961, arts. 145-47.
15 Tuim

CONsr. OF 1961, art. 11 (quotation translated by author).

16 See TuRc. CONST. OF 1961, arts. 13, 16, 23, 26.
17 TuRu. CONST. OF 1961, art. 175.
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thus clearly demonstrated by its position within the norm hierarchy
and its significance within constitutional mechanisms. In this respect,
the Turkish legal system follows the model of continental Europe.
C.

The Characteristicsof Statutory Law

The formal characteristics of statutory law are essentially shaped
by the fact that the legislation must develop through a specific procedure. As to its contents and structure, the Constitutional Court18 and
legal doctrine1 9 indicate some specific criteria. The statute has to be
"general" and "determined."20 "General" means that a statute may not
address individual cases;21 "determined" means that the wording of the
statute should be such that the judge is able to draw a certain meaning
out of it that is theoretically "foreseeable" by the subject. As a rule, the
more a statute touches individual rights, the more it has to be determined. This result arises out of the constitutional concept of nulla
poena sine lege, which is one of the preeminent principles of criminal
law.
Emphasis is placed upon the role of the statutory law by the principle of the "legality of the administration," which means that any administrative body has to act in accordance with law or, if the rights of
an individual person are in question, in accordance with a statute. As a
consequence, the Turkish courts, under the Constitutions of 1961 and
1982, have abandoned the doctrine of sovereign immunity which pro22
tected administrative action from judicial review.
Finally, Article 138 of the Constitution of 1982 provides that not
only are the public administration and the government bound by the
law and the statutory laws, but also the judiciary itself: "The judges are
independent in executing their office; they take their decisions according to their good conscience in harmony with the Constitution, the
statutory laws and the law."2 3 Furthermore, if a judge discovers the
unconstitutionality of a statute, he is not allowed to overrule the statute
by arguing that it violates the Constitution.2 4 Instead, the judge is
18 Judgment of Oct. 25, 1969, Constitutional Court, E.1967/41, K.1969/57, 8 Anayasa
Mahkemesi Kararlari Dergisi [A.M.K.D.1 8 (Turk.).
19 Cf ERGUN OZBUDUN, TORK ANAYASA HUKUKU [TURKISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 171
(2d ed. 1989); MOMTAZ SOYSAL, ANAYASAYA GIRs [INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION] 166
(1968); ERDOCAN TEZIC, ANAYASA HUKUKU [CONSTITUTIONAL LAw] 10 (2d ed. 1991); ERDoCAN
TEZiG, TORKIYE'DE 1961 ANAYASASINA GORE KANUN KAVRAM| [STATUTORY LAW IN TURKEY UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION OF 1961] (1972).
20 ERDoGAN TEZIC, TORK1YE'DE 1961 ANAYASASINA GORE KANUN KAvRAMI, supra note 19,
at 34.
21 There are some exceptions in Turkish constitutional law, including the annual
budget law and acts on the execution of death penalties.
22 A few exceptions are stipulated in the section of the Constitution of 1982 on the
powers of the President of the Republic.
23 TURK. CONST. OF 1961, art. 138 (quotation translated by author).
24 Before 1961, the question of the judicial review of statutory laws by the judiciary was
discussed in Turkish legal literature. See CHRISTIAN RUMPF, DAS RECHTSSTAATSPRINZIP IN DER
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bound to follow the statute as a result of the reasoning of Article 152 of
the Constitution, although he may bring such a statute before the Constitutional Court, pursuant to that article, if the case depends on the
application of such a potentially unconstitutional statute (German:
konkrete Normenkontrolle, Turkish: somut norm denetimi). This underlines
the narrow role of the judge with regard to the formal statute.
It is against this background that the application of the law by the
Turkish judge has to be seen, and it also determines the role and the
manner of the methodological approach of the judge who interprets a
statutory regulation. The wording of the statute and its meaning take
first place before the ingenious fantasy of the judge.
VI. Theories of Juridical Interpretation in Turkey
A.

Approaches to Interpretation in Legal Doctrine

Methodological discussions to the extent of that in the nineteenth-century German doctrine are foreign to Turkish lawyers. Even
if we take into account the fact that Turkish legal scholars observe the
developments in Europe-especially those in Switzerland-we cannot
say that there is any great concern in the Turkish doctrine about the
methods of interpretation of the law.2 5 Nevertheless, one can identify
three different patterns that are discussed by Turkish scholars and, as
is later discussed, by the courts: the grammatical or linguistic interpretation; 26 the historical or subjective interpretation, which could better
be termed the genetic interpretation; 27 and the teleological or objective interpretation. 28 From time to time, allusions to other methods,
TORKISCHEN RECHTSORDNUNG [THE RULE OF LAw IN THE TURKISH LEGAL SySTEM] 229 (1992)
TuRBAN FEYZIOdLU, KANUNLAWIN ANAYASAYA UYGUNLUOUNUN KA.ZAI MURAKABESI [THE JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTORY LAw] 265 (1951); Ali F. Basgil, A Summary of

ConstitutionalDevelopmentsin Turke, 15 ANNALES DE LA FACULTt D'ISTANBUL 74 (1960); Siddick
S. Onar, Hukuk Devieti ve Kazai Murakabe[ The Rule of Law andJudicialReview] XXII/262 SrlASI
LIMLER MECMUASI [REvIEw OF POLTICAL SCIENCES] 451 (1953). Thejudiciary itself refused to
exercise such review. After the establishment of the Constitutional Court in 1961, judicial

review in this respect is exclusively by this court.
25 Even though the book by YASAR KARAVALWN, HUKUKDA OGRETIM, KAYNAKLAR-METOD
rrEACHING-SOURCES-METHOD IN THE LAw] (3d ed. 1986) makes use of the word "method" in
its title, this is far from meaning that the author offers any extended theory about methods in
the law. Another book that might evoke such expectations, but which is not a treatise containing any Turkish discussion-it is the reproduction of the views of mostly Italian and
French authors-is SELAHATTIN KEYMAN, HUKUKA GIRIS vE HUKUK METODOLOJISI [INTRODUCTION TO LAw AND THE METHODOLOGY OF LAw] (1976). Keyman hardly quotes any Turkish

theory or practice.
26 By this method one tries to ascertain the meaning of the legal text through the mere
wording.
27 By "historical interpretation," Turkish lawyers mean the method of evaluating the
law-making process. In German discussion, the notion "genetic" is preferred, whereas "historical" interpretation refers to the evaluation of the statute by considering the history of
preceding statutes and regulations, and the historical, political, social, and general legal circumstances that finally led to the adoption of the statute in question.
28 This interpretation seeks to determine the meaning of the regulation by an evaluation of the aims and the purposes of the statute.
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such as the so-called systematical interpretation, also appear. 29
Without any doubt, Turkish legal writers, as well as the courts, presume that Article 1 of the Turkish Civil Code constitutes the leading
rule for the interpretation of statutes and for the filling of gaps in any
branch of the positive law. The relevant paragraph of this article reads
as follows: "The statute has to be applied with its wording and meaning to any case within its field of application."3 0 The following examples will illustrate how Turkish doctrine approaches the problem of
interpretation and its methods.
The largest of the leading commentaries to the Civil Code states:
The features to be observed by the judge in the course of interpretation of a statute: For the solution of a problem submitted to him, the
judge primarily has to apply the Civil Code and its binding regulations. Doing this, he must consider the wording of the statutory law as
the obvious text, the clear meaning of the regulation. The spirit of the
law derives from the meaning which has its source in the clear wording. Thus, the judge will first have recourse to the wording of the
statute, and if he cannot find a meaning directly, he will try to find a
meaning out of the whole of the statute: out of the spirit. The application accords with the sense of the statute, as such sense has to be
considered, the meaning which arises from the interdependency of
the legal system on which the statute is founded, and the whole of the
statute itself ....
The meaning of the statute can also be elaborated by the use of
logical and etymological analysis, by means of the singular words,
punctuation marks, headings and under-headings, and in reference to
all expressions and phrases used by the legislature. The preparatory
works in the course of the legislation also have to be examined. Furthermore, the meaning of the statute can be extracted from the system
of the regulations.
Another item is the observation of the purposes of the statute.
Interpretations change with time and the needs of life. If we look for
the true meaning, the interpretation should not follow the realities of
the time of adoption but those of the present. This is called the objective modem interpretation. Even those interpreters who defend the
objective historical interpretation admit that an interpretation in accordance with legal developments has to be found if the interpretation, valid at the time of adoption of the regulation,
seems to be
31
insufficient in the face of changing circumstances.

The theory of interpretation proposed in this commentary, although
lacking a well-elaborated argument and foundation-as is also the case
with most of the rest of the literature in this matter-can be summa2 In German theory and practice, this method ranks second in the canon of methods,
after grammatical interpretation.
30 TuRK. CONST. OF 1961, art. 1 (quotation translated by author). "Meaning" is the
translation nearest to the Swiss original text, whereas the Turkish ruh at this place should be
translated as "spirit." Both translations are compatible with the Turkish legal practice of
interpretation.
31 LOTF

DALAMANLI ET AL., I iLMI VE KAzAI ICTiHADLARLA AcIKLAMALI TORK MEDEN

KANUNU [THE TURISH CIVIL CODE, ANNOTATED ON THE BAsis OF LEGAL SCIENCE AND CASE
LAw] 3 (1991) (quotation translated by author).
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rized as follows: In the first place, the wording of the statute has to be
examined linguistically; if semantic and hermeneutic efforts do not
help, the general meaning has to be extracted from the whole of the
regulations of the statute and other statutes in the same field. This
general meaning should help to find the special meaning of the norm
being explicated. At this stage, the judge has to make use of the legislative materials.
Another source, K6prilfi, follows .this concept generally, but does
not mention the importance of the legislative materials.3 2 This may be
due to the fact that he confines himself to the interpretation of the
Civil Code, which is a reproduction of the Swiss Civil Code of considerable age. As a consequence, he finds no reason to place any emphasis
on legislative history materials; as the Civil Code has a certain age and
33
has been extensively intepreted by generations of lawyers.
A. Seref G6zfiyibfik, one of the leading authors in administrative
34
law, refers to the general importance of Article 1 of the Civil Code.
He ranks the methods of interpretation in a manner similar to those
already described: the primary step is grammatical interpretation; the
second is genetic interpretation, which, like other authors, he calls historical interpretation with inclusion of legislative materials; and finally
comes the teleological interpretation, which he marks off from legislative history and which he links with a present-oriented delimitation of
the aims and purposes of the statute. In the end he prefers a mixed
interpretation, stating that "to-interpret the statute in the right way, all
methods quoted above have to be considered."3 5 By putting the
weight on one or the other method, important aspects would be disregarded and therefore the certainty of law endangered. "For these reasons, in the course of interpretation we profit
by the grammatical, the
36
teleological, and the historical method"
Karayal4in starts from the principle that the statute is the written
expression of the will of the legislature.3 7 First, he suggests a grammatical interpretation where the meaning of the wording itself has to be
examined. As the wording may be contrary to the spirit of the statute
and thus oppose the "real will" of the legislature, the latter may have to
be discovered.3 8 According to the author, this is a consequence of the
principles of the primacy of the statutory law and of the judge being
bound by the will of the legislature.
This may perhaps be attained through linguistic, grammatical, logical
32 BOLENT K6PROLO, MEDENI HUKuK [PRIVATE LAW] 99 (1979).
33 Id.
3

A. SEREF G6ZJBCYOK, HUKUKA GIRTS VE HUIUWUN TEMEL KAVR"LAPR [INTRODUCrION

TO LAW AND BASIC NOTIONS OF THE LAW] 62 (1991).
35 Id. at 64 (quotation translated by author).

36

Id. (quotation translated by author).

37 KARAYALQIN, supra note 25, at 84.
38 Id. at 86.
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and systematic considerations. But if the real will of the legislature is
to be ascertained, one often must examine the texts of the government bill or the proposals of the Parliament, their grounds, the
amendments proposed in the commissions and ,their grounds, and
even the debates
of the plenary assembly of the Parliament, in order to
39
get a result.

Another commentator, Bilge, also refers directly to Article 1 of the
Civil Code. 40 He similarly describes the three methods of the grammatical, historical (subjective), and teleological (objective) interpretation. 41 He emphasizes the latter and then proposes,.like G6zfibfiycik, a
mixed interpretation:
This procedure of interpretation, which also may be called the balancing method, is to prompt the comprehension of the statute without
neglecting the legislative materials; one must not, however, content
oneself with [the legislative materials]. Attention must be paid always
to the purpose of the statute, to the needs,
the opinions, and the man42
ner of thinking of the present time.
Bilge states that this is the predominant method preferred by legal
scholars and the courts.
The textbook of Imre on the Turkish civil law contains one of the
most solidly elaborated presentations of the methods to be applied in

the course of interpretation of statutory law.43 Like most of the others,
he starts from Article 1 of the Civil Code. 44 After an extended description of the history of methodological approaches, he comes again to
the three methods: the grammatical method, the subjective or the subjective historical method, and the objective or objective up-to-date
method. According to him, the value of the subjective historical
method is limited. 4 5 In his opinion, one should follow the predominant school of thought and practice, which considers this method not
as an independant methodoloical approach but as a subsidiary means
to interpret a statute. 46 Thus, Imre emphasizes the importance of understanding the wording which, in light of the needs of the present
time, should be complemented by up-to-date objective considerations
in order to discover the aim and purpose of the statute. 4 7 He concludes that first, the text and the headings have to be examined, followed by consideration of the system of the statute and its aim,
purpose, and historical roots.
The preparatory works to the statute (legislative materials) are a supplementary means of interpretation.... In addition to the legislative
39 Id. (quotation translated by author).
40 NECIP BILGE, HUKUK BA5LANGIc|-HUKUKUN TEMEL ILKELERI [LAw FOR BEGINNERS-

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF LAw]

41
42
43
44
45
46
47

195 (8th ed. 1992).

Id. at 196.
Id. at 197 (quotation translated by author).
ZAHIT iMRE, MEDENI HUKUKA GnuS [INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE LAw] (3d ed. 1980).
Id. at 155.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 162.
Id at 164.
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materials, the moral, economic, social, scientific and technical circumstances of that time should be looked at, for they may have had an
influence on the birth of the statute. Namely, it may be that the interests which result from the needs and necessities arising in the develop48

ment of the society have been taken into account by the legislature.
To the extent that imre believes recourse to the legislative materials and the historical roots in Turkey is of lesser importance than in
Switzerland and other European countries, he relates this conclusion
explicitly to the Turkish Civil Code and, specifically, to its coming into
existence. 49 There are, as he states, no legislative materials to testify to
the preparatory foundations of the Great National Assembly of that
time. 50
Tekinay, however, does not entirely follow the positions of the
above-quoted authors. 5 1 For him, the genetic interpretation is itself a
proper method of its own. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that legislative materials should be used carefully and in a restricted manner.
Edis elaborates in a more extended way on what Tekinay, Bilge,
and Imre have stated. 5 2 Again, he reviews the basic methods. For him,
the legislative materials are a natural part of the genetic interpretation
and, at the least, should be used as a supplemental means of interpretation. 53 He gives a clarifying example:
In the course of examining the birth of a statute, the fact that the final
wording had been preceded by a different wording of the legislative
draft or that specific notions have been changed
before appearing in
54
the final text can help to reveal the meaning.

Next, one must consider Ozsunay. 55 This author presents a singu56
lar opinion that totally rejects making use of the legislative materials.
According to Ozsunay, Article 1 of the Civil Code calls upon the judge
to act like an "objective legislature." 57 This starting point, which lifts
one aspect of that provision up to a principle and which offers to the
judge more discretionary power than the supporters of the mixed interpretation, consequently leads to different results. Without any reasoning, Ozsunay rejects the "subjective historical interpretation."5 8
48 Id. at 169 (quotation translated by author).
49 Id.
50 Id. Indeed, the only important materials are the speeches of the Secretary ofjustice,
Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt), which consist of some general considerations about why one should
utilize a translation of the Swiss Civil Code instead of the German or the French Civil Codes.
51 TEKINAY, supra note 8, at 60.
52 SEYFULLAH EIs, MEDENI HuKuKA Gnu$ VE BA$LANGIc, HOKCJMLER! [INTRODUCTION TO
AND THE

PRIMARY RuLEs OF PRIVATE LAw] 189 (1987).

53 Id. at 195.

54 Id. (quotation translated by author).
55 ERGUN OZSUNAY, MEDENI HUKUKA GIRlS [INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE LAw] 188 (5th ed.

1986).
56 Id at 191.
57 Id.

58 This is similar to the opinion of Edis who rejects this method for the filling of normative gaps, which is another issue and has nothing to do with the interpretation of a given
norm and its text. EnIs, supra note 52, at 140.

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[VOL. 19

Under the heading "Methods of Interpretation not Allowed: (i) The
subjective historical interpretation," he states "occasionally, the will of
the legislature may not be perceptible. Especially, if several collective
organs are involved in the legislative process, it is often impossible to
59
reveal the will of the legislature."
Ozsunay then lists the preeminent methods of interpretation. He
explains the "objective historical method" as consisting of the evaluation of the general historical circumstances at the time of the adoption
of the statute, but not including the process of legislation itself.60 Second, he writes about the "objective up-to-date method," which has to
be founded on an evaluation of the actual needs of the present time. 6'
The result of the process of interpretation shall be determined by the
"permanent will of the law" as discovered through the objective
spirit.62 Ozsunay adds a list of methods of interpretation that have
been developed in Germany during the last century. Thus, Ozsunay,
who does not provide any reference to Turkish doctrine or case law,
remains far from the mainstream of Turkish theory and practice as to
the role of legislative history materials in interpretation.
Finally, one should look at Esen's work because his lectures on the
"Interpretation of the Constitution by the Constitutional Court"63 are
still considered a remarkable contribution to that subject, although
they have had little impact on Turkish constitutional practice. Esen
explicitly prefers an approach influenced by both continental European and Anglo-American legal thinking and critically states that "the
Turkish judge has the habit of a positivist approach." 64 According to
Esen, the judge therefore examines the wording of the provision and,
if this appears to be insufficient, "the draft regulation, [and] the opinions advocated during the parliamentary debates, in order to get any
instruction."6 5 Esen urges this method for the Constitutional Court,
but recognizes a tendency of that court to renounce positivist approaches. 6 6 This expectation has not been followed, however, as is
shown below.

59 This is in contradiction to IMRE, supra note 43, though his opinion is based on the
same source-A. MEYER-HAYoz, BERNER KOMMENTAR ZUM ZGB, [BERN COMMENTARY ON THE

CIVIL CODE], Art. 1, No. 132 (1962) (quotation translated by author). The quotation of Ozsunay itself offers nothing more than the conclusion that legislative materials play a role only
as a subsidiary means of interpretation.
0 OZSUNAY, supra note 55, at 192.
61 Id
62 Id
63 BOLENT

NuR

ESEN, ANAYASANIN

ANAYASA MAHKEMESINCE YORUMLAN$1 [INTERPRETA-

TION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT] (1971).

r4 Id at 8 (quotation translated by author).
65 Id. (quotation translated by author).
66 Id. at 17, 19.
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Evaluation of the Role of Legislative History Materials

The Turkish doctrine does not follow a homogeneous pattern of
methodological terminology. Notions of the different methods of interpretation are not always the same; some authors, namely Ozsunay
and Edis, explicitly refer to methods having been developed not only
in Switzerland, but also in Germany. But in general, the presentation
of the methods of interpretation concentrates on the three kinds of
approaches that have their source in Article 1 of the Civil Code. The
grammatical method is without any doubt preeminent. It is followed
by the objective method through which the meaning and purpose of
the statute is found within the limits of the wording and in obedience
to the needs and necessities of the present time. The subjective or
subjective historical method, in this Article described as the genetic
method, is accepted as a proper method of its own only by some Turkish scholars. Nonetheless, with the exception of Ozsunay,•most scholars consider research into the real will of the legislature to be, at the
least, an important subsidiary or supplementary means of interpretation. In any case, review of legislative history materials constitutes a
well-settled part of Turkish legal methodology.
This assertion is supported by a more practical fact: Textbooks
and handbooks on Turkish law in Turkey quite often contain not only
the text of the subject statutory and administrative provisions, but also
the text of official statements, grounds, and reports of commissions
related to the legislative process. Thus, almost all Turkish legal writers
advocate that legislative history material has to be considered in the
course of interpretation of statutory law if the purpose and the meaning of the provision cannot be found merely through an examination
of the wording itself.
VII.

Statutory Interpretation by the Constitutional Court
A.

The Method and the Decisions of the Constitutional Court

The methods developed by legal writers are also reflected in the
decisions of the Constitutional Court.67 As a result of the different
character of the conflicts to be resolved, the interpretation of constitutional norms may follow criteria different than those applicable to the
interpretation of statutory law. At the level of the Constitution, there
often is conflict between two different or opposite constitutional
norms that must be resolved. Quite frequently, the statute in question
is the concrete expression of a constitutionally protected public interest, that at the same time violates another constitutionally protected
private interest.
67 Cf European ConstitutionalCourts Conference VIII, compiled in 2 THE HIERARCHY OF CONAND rrs FUNCTION IN THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 141

STrUTnONAL NoRMs

(Turkish Constitutional Court ed., 1990) (reports by Judge Mustafa Gnil and others).
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However, both the constitutional norms and the statutory law that
has been submitted to the Constitutional Court for constitutional review have to be interpreted in order to determine what the law is.
Without going into the details of methods of interpretation within the
constitutional review, it is clear that the interpretation of statutory law
by the Constitutional Court is at least as relevant as the interpretation
of statutory law by other courts. Furthermore, the interpretation of a
statute by the Constitutional Court is, by virtue of the constitutional
force of its judgment, generally binding. Therefore, the manner in
which the Constitutional Court ascertains the meaning of a statutory
provision is important. With regard to the interpretation of statutory
law, the Constitutional Court is in unison with the majority of the
Turkish literature: It starts with the wording (grammatical method),
and then turns to an objective up-to-date interpretation, which also
incorporates an examination of the legislative materials. 68 The following examples will show the role of legislative history materials in the
process of interpreting statutory law by the Constitutional Court.
B. Examples: Case Law
In a decision dated September 24, 1987,69 the Court had to consider a statute, adopted in 1924 and amended in 1963, which provided
for the suspension of village mayors and members of the village councils. The statute also allowed a sort of "judicial" review of such acts, this
review being effected by "independent" administrative bodies. The
Council of State, which brought the case to the Constitutional Court,
had estimated that such a review could not be considered a "judicial
review" in the sense of Article 125 of the Constitution. 70 The Constitutional Court examined the genetic development of this Article. As Article 125 followed Article 114 of the (precedent) Constitution of 1961,
the Court also examined the official grounds as well as the reports of
the Constitutional Commission of the Assembly of Representatives of
the time. 7 1 In this case, the decision was exclusively founded on the
evaluation of the constitutional legislative history materials. The result
was that the provision of the statute was held to be in conformity with
the Constitution.
Another decision, dated June 14, 1988,72 reviewed an amendment
of the legislation on elections. According to this amendment, political
parties had to meet certain conditions (e.g., the organization of regional assemblies) as a basis for their participation in election cam68 Id.at 153.
69 Judgment of Sept. 24, 1987, Constitutional Court, E.1987/4, K.1987, Resmi Gazete
[R.G.] No. 19673, at 17 (Dec. 23, 1987) (Turk.).
70 Tuuc. CONSr. oF 1961, art. 125.
71 Tuuc. CoNsr. oF 1961, arts. 114, 125.
72 Judgment of June 14, 1988, Constitutional Court, E.1988/14, K.1988/18, Resmi
Gazete [R.G.] No. 19872, at 23 (July 14, 1988) (Turk.).
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paigns. The same amendment had tried to coordinate the dates of
general and local elections. In the course of interpretation, the Constitutional Court made use of legislative materials several times. 73 The
legislature, in statements during the legislative process, had alleged
certain reasons that should have legitimated the holding of general
and local elections on the same date. In this case, however, this would
have led to a delay of some months in the local elections that year, and
thus would have caused the lapse a period of more than five years since
the previous elections. Consequently, the Court had to determine
what the Constitution meant in its requirement of elections "every five
years." In the end, the Constitutional Court could not find an interest
protected by the Constitution that would legitimate an electoral period
74
of more than exactly five years.
Later, the Court had to review a provision of the same statute that
again involved a changed electoral period: in this case, the time between the interim elections-provided for by the Constitution-and
the next regular elections. 75 Again, the Constitutional Court examined the official grounds of the government bill. The Court tried to
interpret the term "organs" through the use of legislative materials, but
to no avail. In this case as well, the examination of legislative history
materials was constituent for the final decision. As a result, the provi76
sions were held unconstitutional.
A decision dated January 28, 1988, was taken after review of a statute that delegated budgetary control over public enterprises and funds
from the Parliament to the Government. 77 The public funds at issue,
which were placed under the control of the Government itself and financed by duties imposed by law, were thought to serve as a means to
avoid budgetary restrictions and create a sort of "black budget" under
the control of the executive power. Again, the Constitutional Court
investigated the process of legislation, especially the reports of the
Budgetary Commission of the Parliament. 78 The interpretation of the
constitutional norm in question, Article 165, was based on an examination of the debates and reports of the Consultative Assembly, which
79
was involved in the adoption of the Constitution of 1982.
A very good example of both historical (in our sense) and genetic
interpretation 8 ° is the decision dated June 21, 1990.81 According to
73 Id. at 43, 53, 57.
74 Id. at 44.
75 Id. at 52.
76 Id.
77 Judgment ofJan. 28, 1988, Constitutional Court, E. 1987/12, K.1988/3, Resmi Gazete
[R.G.] No. 19952, at 5 (Oct. 7, 1988) (Turk.).
78 Id. at 14.
79 I. at 15.
80 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
81 Judgment of June 21, 1990, Constitutional Court, E.1990/7, K.1990/11, Resmi
Gazete [R.G.] No. 20776, at 25 (Feb. 4, 1991) (Turk.).
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the statutory provisions of the public law of construction, the cities and

the provinces as administrative bodies have the right of "field clearing"-changing extensions and borders of real estate in the course of
planning without a formal procedure of expropriation.8 2 This provision was deemed unconstitutional by an administrative court that
brought the case to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional
Court started its considerations by drawing upon the entire history of
public construction law since 1848. It then described the actual system
of this branch of the law and finally integrated the legislative materials
into its statements. 83 On review of these findings, the Court declared
the provision constitutional.
Allowing the establishment of universities by private foundations
had been the purpose of an amendment to the Universities Act of
1981,84 declared unconstitutional by the decision of May 30, 1990, on
the ground that universities have to be established by the State.8 5 In
this decision, the historical and genetic methods were again basic elements of interpretation. To consider which principles were relevant to
the establishment of universities, the Court examined: Article 130 of
the Constitution of 1982;86 Article 120 of the Constitution of 1961,87 its

amendments of 19718 and the official statements of the 1971 Parliament;8 9 the draft of the Consultant Assembly 1982;90 and the written
notes of the National Security Council which criticized and changed
that draft and which finally adopted the provision in its present form. 9 '
Against this background the Constitutional Court inquired into the
aims and the purposes ofArticle 130, especially as far as the words
"university" and "freedom of research," and other notions were concerned. Again, legislative materials played a decisive role in this
judgment.
92
Finally the decision of January 28, 1992, is worth mentioning.
Here, the Court had to consider a provision of the Tariff, Strike and
82 Law No. 3194 of May 3, 1985, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 18749 (May 9, 1985) (Turk.).
83 Judgment of Feb. 4, 1991, Constitutional Court, E.1990/7, K.1990/11, Resmi Gazete

[R.G.] No. 20776, at 38 (Turk.).
84 Law No. 3589 of Nov. 23, 1989, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 20358 (Nov. 30, 1989)
(Turk.).
85 Judgment of May 30, 1990, Constitutional Court, E.1990/2, K.1990/10, Resm! Gazete
[R.G.] No. 20781, at 13 (Feb. 4,1991) (Turk.).
86 I. at 20.
87 1&L
88 Id.
89 Id. at 18.
90 Id at 20.
91 In this report, "National Security Council" means the "Millf Gtivenlik Konseyi," which
represented the military junta between September 12, 1980, and December 6, 1983. It must

not be confused with the "Milli Givenlik Kurulu" (NSC) which is, under the Constitutions of
1961 and 1982, a consultant body to the government for internal and external security
matters.
92 Judgment of Jan. 28, 1992, Constitutional Court, E.1992/7, K1992/2, Resmi Gazete
[R.G.] No. 21169, at 17 (Mar. 12, 1992) (Turk.).
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Lockout Act,93 according to which workers who were not members of a

trade union had to pay certain contributions to the trade union in
order to get the benefit of tariff agreements. 9 4 The case is one of those
that falls under Provisional Article 15 of the Constitution, under which
statutes and regulations adopted between September 12, 1980, and December 6, 1983-the period under the military regime-were not to
be brought to the Constitutional Court. Thus, the case was declared
inadmissible.9 5 Nevertheless, the Court took the opportunity to expound on interpretive methodology.
Before all, statutory laws must be applied by their wording. The words
which are used in the text of the statutes have to be understood in the

terms of the juridical terminology. It is an exigency of the law that a
provision of the statute must not only be'interpreted according to the

social and economic needs96 of the day, but also in respect to the period
that it has been in force.

There was no need to refer to legislative materials. However, the Court
clearly indicated that the history of application of the law must be considered and, in fact, such history starts with the legislative materials.
C. Evaluation of the Role of Legislative History Materials

The representative selection of cases of the Constitutional Court,
described above, demonstrates that this Court refers extensively to the
legislative history materials when it has to examine statutes for their
normative content. The same is done with the materials of the Constitution, when the normative content and extent of a constitutional
norm have to be determined. The Court even moves beyond the doctrine when researching legal history, in order to highlight the meaning
and understanding of the legal notions and regulations in question.
VIII. The Practice of Interpretation by the Court of Cassation
A.

Preliminary Remarks

The Court of Cassation consists of twenty Chambers of civil law
and ten Chambers of criminal law. On appeal, these Chambers review
the decisions of the courts of the first instance, and they do not state
on the facts. In the case of a "cassation," or quashing of a judgment,
the case is heard again by a court of first instance. If this court maintains its former opinion, a second appeal is heard at the 'Great Chamber" (assembly of the Presidents of the Chambers), whose decision
cannot be overruled.
If there is a divergence of the case law within the different Chambers or the Great Chamber, the specific legal question may be brought
93 Law No.2822 of May 5, 1983, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 18040 (May 7,1983) (Turk.).
94 Id.

95 Judgment of Jan. 28, 1992, Constitutional Court,' ResmiGazete [R.G.] No. 21169, at
25 (Turk.).
96 Id. at 23 (quotation translated by author).
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to the Presidency of the Court of Cassation, which may call in the Plenary Assembly of the Chambers of civil law or criminal law-or bothin order to "unify" the jurisprudence. As many as eighty judges or
more sit for these hearings. Rulings of this Plenary Assembly are published in the Official Journal and have the force of statutory law. The
present examples, except for the last one, are selected from the official
collection 9 7 of such decisions.
B.

Examples: Case Law

The decision of February 18, 1981,98 involved a problem relating
to compensation for damages and interest after a violation of copyrights, as well as the applicability of the general principles of the Code
of Obligations to the right to compensation. The Court had to determine the extent to which the legal provisions protected the copyright
itself, as opposed to the users. The Court started by examining the
motives of the legislature. 99
Another judgment, on December 8, 1982,100 is also considered a
leading case on the question of methodology. The basic question concerned jurisdiction over cases where Social Security seeks recourse
against third party debtors. When interpreting the statute governing
the Annuity Office, the Court remarked on the features of statutory
interpretation. It emphasized the unconditional preeminence of the
wording of a statute, but also examined the interpretations' harmony
with the intentions of the legislature, as indicated by the draft bill. 10 1
The Court also stated that the "old meaning" of the materials is of less
weight than a determination of purposes in accordance with actual
needs and conditions of the present time.' 0 2 In other words, the legislative materials may lose their importance with the passage of time. In
the actual case, the Court examined the written motives of the government and came to the conclusion that the materials would not assist in
solving the problem with the wording of the statute in the case.' 0 3 In
fact, the Court expressly preferred the grammatical interpretation, followed by the teleological method, but it also examined some of the
97 YARGITAY IgFrHADLARI BIRLFSTIRME KARARLAi [DECISIONS UNDER THE UNIFIEDJURISDIG
TION OF THE COURT OF CASSATION]

[Y.I.B.K.].

98 Judgment of Feb. 18, 1981, Plenary Assembly of the Court of Cassation, E.1980/1,
K1981/2, 6 YARGITAY ICTIHADLAR1 BIRLE$TIRME KARARLARi [DECISIONS UNDER THE UNIFIED JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CASSATION] [Y.I.B.K.] 10 (Turk.).
99 Id. at 13.
100 Judgment of Dec. 8, 1982, Court of Cassation, E.1982/4, K1982/4, 6 YARGITAY iCTIHADLARi BIRLESTIRME KARARLAR [DECISIONS UNDER THE UNIFIED JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
OF CASSATION]

[Y.I.B.K.] 48 (Turk.).

101 Id. at 52.
102 Mf.

hukuk hiktimleri," which
103 Id. The Court had some problems with the notion of "'zel
actually has a double meaning: it means both "regulations of private law" and "special law
regulations."
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legislative materials in order to come to a finding.' 0 4
The Plenary Assembly proceeded similarly in its decision dated
February 1, 1984.105 This case involved the extent to which an appeal
may be precluded, after expiration of the term provided by the provisions of an amendment to the Civil Procedure Code. 10 6 The minority
of the Assembly made extensive use of the reports of the Law Commission of the National Security Council, 10 7 while the majority rejected
these considerations, arguing that the motives of the Law Commission
were not in accord with the express wording.10 8 One of the dissenting
votes pointed out that the Court of Cassation, and the Constitutional
Court as well, made use of legislative history materials when interpreting statutory provisions. 10 9 No dissent asserted that legislative materials have binding force; only the statute itself is binding. Yet, as another
dissenting vote insisted, methodical interpretation of statutory law has
to respect the legislative materials. 110 In their words:
Turkish law has decided in favor of the teleological interpretation and
has chosen the procedure of investigating the purpose of the wording.
There is, however, no doubt that the wording itself predominates....
The means to be applied in the interpretation are, of course, the preparatory works of the legislature and the purposes that can be drawn
out of the official grounds. Nevertheless, in the teleological interpretation, the subjective will of the legislature (voluntas legislatoris) and
the reason for the institution of the legislation procedure (occasio legis)
are not the primary and only measures. The law is permanent, while
the legislature is temporary .... ill

This vote demonstrates some unity between both the majority and the
minority on the issue of the methodology of interpretation.
The judgment of May 14, 1984,112 addressed double appropriation of real estate under the Statute on Settlement of 1934, and its
amendment of 1939. The regulation in question had provided that
proprietors whose estates had been appropriated by new settlers could
bring their claims only within a certain period. 113 The Court had to
consider whether proprietors, who themselves had appropriated real
104 I.

105 Judgment of Feb. 1, 1984, Court of Cassation, E.1983/9, K 1984/2, 6 YARGITAY iTrHADIARI BIRLEsTRME KAALmuAW [DECISIONS UNDER THE UNIFIEDJURISDICTION OF THE COURT

OF CASSATION] [Y.I.B.K] 146 (Turk.).

106 Law No. 2494 ofJuly 16,1981, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 17404 (July 18, 1981) (Turk.).
107 judgment of Feb. 1, 1984, Court of Cassation, E.1983/9, K.1984/2, 6 YARGITAY Ir.
TIHADLARI BIRLEsTiRME KARARLARI [DECISIONS UNDER THE UNIFIEDJURISDICTION OF THE COURT
OF CASSATION] [Y.I.B.K.] at 156, 161, 163, 167, 172 and 177 (Cilingiroglu, Cenberci, Doganay,
Erdogan, Elgin, and Sel4uk dissenting) (Turk).
108 Id. at 154.
109 Id. at 161 (Cenberci dissenting).
110 Id. at 163 (Varlik dissenting).
111 Id. at 163, 177 (quotation translated by author).
112 Judgment of May 14, 1984, Court of Cassation, E.1983/10, K.1984/4, 6 YARGITAY Ir-

TrHADLARI

BrRLE$-nRME KARARLARI [DECISIONS UNDER THE UNIFIED JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
OF CASSATION] [Y.I.B.K.] 205 (Turk.).

113 Such cases occur in regions lacking a well-organized land registration system.
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estate under the Statute of Settlement, could benefit from these provisions. The Court of Cassation affirmed the rights of these proprietors.
The Court based its decision on extensive investigations of the legislative history materials, especially the reports of the Mixed Commission of 1939.114 On a second issue, relating to the beginning point of
the claims period, the Court explained its method of interpretation.' 1 5
It stated:
From Article I of the Civil Code comes the principle that a statutory
provision is valid not only according to its wording, but also following
its text and spirit. The judgment of the Plenary Assembly, given on
March 27, 1957, provided that "the statement of the meaning of a statutory law must, in the first place, rely on the sense found in the wording; if this meaning is in opposition to the aims and the purposes of
the adoption of the law, the decision has to follow the meaning which
116
can be drawn out of the spirit of the statutory law."
The Court quoted other cases and distinguished this judgment from
the decision of December 8, 1982, where unconditional priority had
been assigned to the wording.'1 7 There the Court deemphasized the
importance of the teleological interpretation. This made the further
proceding comprehensive; the Court based its final result on the government draft of the amendment of 1939, and the reports of the Law
Commission and the Special Commission for Policies of Settlement. 118
The last decision to be considered in this Article was entered by
the 11th Chamber (Civil Law) of the Court of Cassation.11 9 The
Chamber had to answer the question of whether interest on arrears to
Social Security should be paid by a commercial corporation in bankruptcy. The Social Security Act was silent on this issue.' 20 The Court
turned to systematic comparisons between the Turkish law of bankruptcy, 12 1 which prohibits the claim of interest on arrears, and the Collection of Public Claims Act,122 which provides for such interest. The
Court found that when the Commission of Health and Social Affairs of
the Great National Assembly debated an amendment in 1985, it considered both the Social Security Act and the Collection of Public
Claims Act as being closely related to each other.' 23 On this ground,
114 Judgment of May 14, 1984, Court of Cassation, E.1983/10, K.1984/4, 6 YARGrAY IkTiHADLARI BIRLETIRME KARARLARI [DECISIONS UNDER THE UNIFIED JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

OF CASSATION] [Y.I.B.K.] at 211 (Turk.).
115 Id.at 210.

116 Id. (quotation translated by author).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 211.
119 judgment of Dec. 26, 1988, 11th Chamber of the Court of Cassation, E.274, K1136,

274

YARCITAY ICTIHADLARI BIRLESTIRME KARALuARI [DECISIONS UNDER THE UNIFIED JURISDIG
TION OF THE COURT OF CASSATION] [Y.I.B.K.] 12 (Turk.) in DALAMANLI, supra note 31, at 12.

120 Law No. 506 of July 17, 1964, ResmiA Gazete [R.G.] No. 11766-11779 (July 29- Aug. 1,
1964) (Turk.).
121 Law No. 2004 of July 9, 1932, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 2128 (July 19, 1932) (Turk.).
122 Law No. 6183 ofJuly 21, 1953, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 8469 (July 28, 1953) (Turk.).
123 Judgment of Dec. 26, 1988, Court of Cassation, E.274, K(1136, 274 YARGITAY IQ-
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the Court came to the conclusion that the provisions on the interest
payable on arrears of the Social Security Act should be interpreted in
light of the Collection of Public Claims Act. 124 Again, legislative history material played a decisive role.
C. Evaluation of the Role of Legislative History Materials
The case law of the' Court of Cassation gives legislative history
materials a firm role within the framework of methods for interpreting
statutory law. Questions remain as to the ranking of the grammatical
and the teleological interpretation, however. In its decision dated May
14, 1984, the Court obviously preferred the teleological method. In
none of its decisions, however, did the Court deny the importance of
the legislative materials, and thus it followed the majority of the legal
literature, as well the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. It
considered the legislative materials a subsidiary means of interpretation for determining the objective meaning of a statute. Sometimes
the legislative materials were quoted in order to supplement a result
that had been extracted from the actual wording. At other points, the
Court has made use of legislative materials in order to show a relationship to the "spirit of the time." Finally, there were instances where the
legislative materials even served as the main foundation of the
decision.
IX.

The Practice of Interpretation by the Council of State
A.

Preliminary Remarks

The Council of State is the highest administrative court, and its
judicial functions can be compared with the French Council of State.
It is independent, in the sense that there is a strict separation of powers, and it has two Chambers that review in advance draft regulations
of the government. In addition, eight Chambers sit for trials.
The Council of State's procedure is not comparable to that of the
Court of Cassation. Aside from the parties, there are-following the
French system-an Advocate General (Danistaysavisi) and a Judge of
Instruction who prepare the case and give their reports in the hearing.
The method of investigation and the similarity to the French system
suggest that methodological considerations are of lesser importance.
Nevertheless, one can find several examples of methodological considerations in the jurisprudence of the Council of State.
TIHADLARI BIRLESTIRME KARARLAR] [DECISIONS UNDER THE UNIFIED JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

OF CASSATION]
124 Id.

[Y.I.B.K.] 13 (Turk.) in DAZAMANI, supra note 31, at 13.
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B. Examples: Case Law
A decision of October 21, 1983,125 reviewed a governmental de-

cree on the distribution of press cards and its conformity with a statute
adopted in 1960. In this context, the function of the General Directorate for Press and Publications had to be determined. In order to reveal the purpose of that directorate, the Council first examined the
grounds of the government bill which preceded the adoption of a statute of 1920.126

In a decision dated November 5, 1986,127 the Council of State
followed both the grammatical and teleological methods. In this case,
the Court had to determine the powers of a president of the university
who had been appointed temporarily. According to the Council, a regulation must be interpreted "primarily in the frame of its proper meaning and purpose," which can be founded on systematic
considerations. 128
Another relevant decision is that of December 29, 1987,129 which

was of great political importance at that time. The question was
whether a public servant, who had been suspended by an act of the
civil public administration initiated by the military authorities during a
military state of emergency,1 30 can reclaim a post in the public administration after the end of that state of emergency. The Council of State
had to interpret a provision of an 1981 amendment to the Military
State of Emergency Act of 1971, according to which a public servant,
once suspended, "must never again be engaged in the public administration." 13 1 The Court examined the official grounds of that provision
and the extensive debates of the Consultative Assembly. From this
foundation, the Council of State concluded that the prohibition continued after the end of the military state of emergency. 132
125 Judgment of October 21, 1983, Fifth Chamber, E.1982/506, K.1983/127, 54-55
Danistay Dergisi [Review of the Council of State] [D.D.] 141.
126 Id.
127 Judgment of Nov. 5, 1986, Fifth Chamber, E.1985/729, K.1986/1234, 66-67 Danistay

Dergisi [Review of the Council of State] [D.D.] 241.
128 Id. at 244 (quotation translated by author).
129 Judgment of Dec. 29, 1987, Fifth Chamber, E.1987/2011, K2095, 70-71 Danistay
Dergisi [Review of the Council of State] [D.D.] 230.
130 This type of state of emergency, as was proclaimed in the whole country on September 12, 1980, is a state of emergency under full military authority, whereas the "normal" state
of emergency-like the one currently in place in the southeast of Turkey-is under a
strengthened civil authority. Both types of states of emergency, as well as the state of war, are
regulated by the Constitution and by separate statutes. See Christian Rumpf, Der Not- und
Ausnahmezustand im Ttirkischen Verfassungsrecht [States of Emergency and MartialLaw in Turkish

Constitutional Law], 48:4 ZErrSCHRIFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES 6)FFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERREcTrr [HEIDELBERG J. OF PUBLIC INT'L L.] 683 (1988).
131 Law No. 2766 of December 28, 1982, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 17914 (Dec. 30, 1982)
(Turk.) (quotation translated by author).
132 The dissenting votes criticized the majority for not considering the special situation
under which the provision was adopted. Under the rule of law, a narrow interpretation
should have been chosen. A few months later, the dissenting minority succeeded in chang-
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C. Evaluation of the Role of Legislative History Materials
In general, the Council of State in its decisions tries to rely on the
plain wording of the statutory provisions under consideration; without
any clear foundation, the Court determines the purpose of the statute.
In some cases, however, the Council of State expressly makes use of
legislative materials, including both the official grounds and the protocols of the debates of the Parliament.
Thus, with respect to the Council of State, if the wording itself is
not sufficient to reveal a meaning, the Court tries to explicate the aims
and purposes of the statute on the basis of teleological, systematical,
and finally genetic considerations, with the help of the legislative history materials.
X.

Conclusion

The development of the Turkish legal order shows that Turkey
possesses a continental European legal system. This fact is also reflected by both traditional and modern legal education, and in Turkish
legal thinking. Consequently, the position of statutory law within the
legal system follows criteria familiar to the continental European legal
system, including principles of the legality of the administration, and
of courts being bound to the statute that has to be "general" and "determined." Statutes take, after the Constitution, a privileged place
within the norm hierarchy. Thus, the interpretation of the statute is
highly relevant.
Turkish scholars have not engaged in a truly controversial discussion of methodological problems. They may show minor divergence in
terminology and in weighing the different methods or means of interpretation, but all of them-with the notable exception of Ozsunayconsider the examination of legislative history materials either a
proper method on its own (subjective method or subjective historical
method), or as a subsidiary means within the teleological (objective)
method.
The case law of the Constitutional Court is the most extensive,
with respect to the examination of legislative history materials. This
Court attributes to legislative history materials a preeminent place in
interpretation of statutory law. The Court of Cassation has also developed a clear hierarchy of methods: the grammatical method, followed
by the teleological method. The legislative history materials are a subsidiary means to be employed, if the evaluation of the wording and the
place of a provision within the system of the surrounding statutes does
not permit a final determination of its aims and purposes, and is thereing the jurisprudence of the Council of State. See also, Entscheidung der Vereinigten Senate des
tiirlischen Staatsrats v. 7.12.1989 [Decision of the United Chambers of the Council of State], 17
EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZErrSCHIFr 107 (1990).
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fore unclear. Finally, the practice of the Council of State is quite similar to that of the Court of Cassation. Though this Court has placed
little emphasis on the discussion of methodological issues, its interpretive approach permits the conclusion that the Council of State also
makes use of legislative history materials within the teleological interpretation, if the statute's wording is insufficient.
In general, we can conclude that Turkish practice follows the pattern of a civil law system under the principle of sovereignty of the Nation, represented by the national parliament. The judge is narrowly
bound by the text of written law and his margin of interpretation and

supplementation is limited by the will of the legislature, as far as this
will can be determined and aligned with actual needs. In the latter
context, legislative history materials are an important means of ascertaining the law.

